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1.0 Introduction 24 
 25 
Hope Olson realized that information science and 26 
knowledge organization should be based on theory. Two 27 
examples from her rich production are: 1) Olson (2001) 28 
describes how the dichotomous principles of  western 29 
philosophical heritage create classification systems, which 30 
privilege the mainstream, majority view; and 2) Olson 31 
(2002) brings a critical feminist perspective to key issues 32 
in knowledge organization. The title of  her book, The 33 
Power to Name, is in itself  a powerful expression of  an ex-34 
tremely important theoretical principle: the assignment 35 
of  a subject to a document is not a neutral act but is a 36 
policy act contributing to facilitate certain uses of  that 37 
document at the expense of  other uses. The importance 38 
of  this theoretical principle—and of  theory in general—39 
cannot be overestimated. (See more about Olson’s pro-40 
duction and its relation to theory in Fox 2015). Many phi-41 
losophers have recognized the importance of  theory for 42 
classification; David Hull (1998), for example, wrote: 43 
“The fundamental elements of  any classification are its 44 
theoretical commitments, basic units and the criteria for 45 
ordering these basic units into a classification.” 46 
Also in my own writings, this view has often been 47 
highlighted (e.g., Hjørland 2008 and 2013). For example, I 48 
wrote (2008, 335): 49 
 50 
In every domain different theories, approaches, in-51 
terests and “paradigms” exist, which also tend to de-52 
scribe and classify the objects according to their 53 
views and goals. For example, psychoanalysis and 54 
biological psychiatry disagree on how mental illness 55 
should be classified and they disagree about the 56 
value of  a particular classification scheme such as 57 
the DSMIV.  58 
 59 
The claim here is that we have many approaches and theo-60 
ries of  knowledge organization and among them some 61 
claim that they are not theories: they claim that classifica-62 
tion can be or should be atheoretical. This is, of  course, a 63 
view that should be examined as should any other view or 64 
theory. If  we want to defend any theory (and the teaching 65 
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of  theories), we have first of  all to defend ourselves against 1 
atheoretical research and atheoretical classification. In this 2 
paper, the focus is atheoretical classification. This is how-3 
ever, related to the broader issue of  atheoretical research 4 
(and atheoretical practice, including atheoretical library and 5 
information practices—the generic concept being atheo-6 
retical activities). Our task can also be understood as “to 7 
uncover the hidden theoretical assumptions in activities, 8 
which claim to be atheoretical” (cf., Slife and Williams 9 
1995). Some researchers do recommend atheoretical re-10 
search (e.g. Cole 1996), while others consider it a false 11 
category. Economist Michael P Keane (2010), for example, 12 
wrote: “All econometric work relies heavily on a priori as-13 
sumptions. The main difference between structural and 14 
experimental (or ‘atheoretic’) approaches is not in the 15 
number of  assumptions but the extent to which they are 16 
made explicit.” 17 
Windschitl (2004) considered atheoretical research as a 18 
kind of  “folk theories of  ‘inquiry.’” In this paper, I shall 19 
not go into this broader discussion but will focus on atheo-20 
retical classification, while the broader issues concerning 21 
other forms of  atheoretical activity are only superfluously 22 
covered and reserved for a future paper. 23 
 24 
2.0 The paradox of  atheoretical positions 25 
 26 
In Hjørland (2015) I defined the concept “theory” as a 27 
statement or a conception, which is considered open to 28 
questioning and which is connected with background as-29 
sumptions (i.e., theory is the way something is considered). 30 
Theories form interconnected systems of  grand, middle 31 
rank and micro theories and actions; concepts, observa-32 
tions, practices and artifacts are theory-laden. 33 
The idea of  atheoretical research, practice and classifica-34 
tion is related to the positivist dichotomy between observa-35 
tional and theoretical statements: What we can see (e.g., a 36 
hammer or a blackbird) are here considered “given,” not 37 
theory or theory-laden. Wilfrid Sellars (1956), among many 38 
others, criticized the view that perceptions of  sense data 39 
give immediate knowledge that can serve as the foundation 40 
of  empirical knowledge. He called this "the myth of  the 41 
given.” The opposite of  this myth is known from many 42 
philosophical positions such as historicism, pragmatism, 43 
paradigm theory, hermeneutics and activity theory, which 44 
all claim that human perception is “mediated” by language 45 
and other culturally developed sign systems. The positivist 46 
dichotomy between observational and theoretical state-47 
ments came into crisis (see Putnam 1962) as did the logical 48 
positivist program in general in the aftermath of  Kuhn’s 49 
(1962) The Structure of  Scientific Revolutions. When a clear dis-50 
tinction between observations and theories cannot be ob-51 
tained, it follows that all human actions are theoretically 52 
laden and the very idea of  atheoretical action becomes an 53 
oxymoron (as does the concept of  “raw data,” cf., Gitel-54 
man 2013). According to Novick (1988), historical science 55 
considered itself  objective from its positivist foundation 56 
about 1880 until, for example, black people and women 57 
entered scholarship and put forward alternative views on 58 
history. This example may demonstrate a general principle: 59 
the only way something can be revealed as theoretically 60 
laden is by developing an alternative view or theory (e.g., by 61 
introducing people with other cultural perspectives or 62 
other disciplinary backgrounds, or engaged in broader phi-63 
losophical studies). Very often, things look for a very long 64 
time as “given” or “atheoretical” until a new understanding 65 
reveals their theoretical nature. 66 
There is, however, an important difference between an 67 
abstract claim that something is theoretically loaded and a 68 
specific analysis of  “how” this thing is theoretically loaded. 69 
It is problematic, for example, to claim that all research 70 
done by men is wrong just because it is done by men. 71 
Some men have contributed to feminist theory or to 72 
knowledge acknowledged by feminist epistemology. There-73 
fore, claims of  theoretical “bias” should be specified, not 74 
just held as a generalized principle. 75 
The methodological implications should be obvious: re-76 
searchers who possess broad background knowledge and 77 
know alternative views should be better equipped to evalu-78 
ate those theories and to do better research and to better 79 
classify things. They are less vulnerable to the mistake of  80 
“naïve realism” or choosing a problematic theoretical basis. 81 
Based on such knowledge of  different perspectives, re-82 
searchers and classifiers may negotiate different theoretical 83 
views and choose the optimal solution or the best com-84 
promise. From this perspective, atheoretical positions must 85 
be considered less advanced. However, as we shall see in 86 
the following section, atheoretical positions may be ex-87 
tremely successful. It is a paradox that solutions that are 88 
more primitive are more successful compared to more ad-89 
vanced solutions. How can this be the case? For answering 90 
this question, it is important to consider the extraordinary 91 
success of  an “atheoretical” classification. Here the DSM-92 
III will be used as an example, but it is certainly not an ex-93 
ception. (DSM has formerly been investigated in knowl-94 
edge organization and information science, by, e.g. Bowker 95 
and Star 1999; Fujigaki 2006; and Spasser 1998). 96 
 97 
3.0 The DSM classification 98 
 99 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders (DSM) is 100 
a classification system for mental disorders published by 101 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Today, it is 102 
extremely influential—also internationally—and by far the 103 
most important diagnostic tool in its domain. This was, 104 
however, not the case with the first edition, which was 105 
published in 1952 (APA 1952). The following editions are 106 
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the second edition, DSM-II (APA 1968), the third edition, 1 
DSM-III (APA 1980), the fourth edition, DSM-IV-TR 2 
(APA 2000) and the fifth edition, DSM-5 (APA 2013). The 3 
first two editions were relatively theoretically based, but 4 
with DSM-III, the atheoretical principle took over, which 5 
seems particularly paradoxical because American psychia-6 
try at that time was strongly influenced by biologically ori-7 
ented theory (Demazeux and Singy 2015, xiv-xv): 8 
 9 
Given this general evolution of  American psychiatry, 10 
the history of  the DSM is paradoxical. The third edi-11 
tion (DSM-III), published in 1980, constitutes ac-12 
cording to historians a true nosological revolution. 13 
But this revolution did not consist in having fully 14 
embraced neurological or genetic factors, as we 15 
might have expected given the general evolution of  16 
psychiatry, and especially of  American psychiatry. 17 
Rather, it consisted in remaining, or trying to remain, 18 
atheoretical. The DSM-III offered a classification 19 
that voluntarily ignored the etiological models of  20 
mental disorders, in order to focus instead on the 21 
task of  providing unambiguous descriptions of  these 22 
disorders by means of  precise and exhaustive diag-23 
nostic criteria. It is often said that the DSM-III broke 24 
with psychoanalysis, which was dominant in large 25 
American cities. It is less often said that it also broke 26 
with the essentially biological direction of  its prede-27 
cessors (while the influence of  psychoanalysis on the 28 
DSM-I and DSM-II is regularly stressed by histori-29 
ans, we should not forget that the first two editions 30 
of  the DSM gave an important role to biology, as il-31 
lustrated by the key category of  “Organic Brain syn-32 
drome”). 33 
 34 
Despite the atheoretical nature of  DSM-III and following 35 
editions (or because of  it?) it became an extreme success 36 
(Demazeux and Singy 2015, xv-xvi): 37 
 38 
There is another paradox in the history of  the DSM: 39 
its [DSM-III’s] extraordinary success. While the 40 
DSM-III did not offer any theoretical innovation, 41 
but only a stupendous methodological audacity, its 42 
impact on contemporary psychiatric discourse and 43 
practice has been considerable. The first printing of  44 
the DSM-III, in 1980, was quickly sold out. It was 45 
soon translated into many languages…The succes-46 
sive editions, the DSM-III-R (1987), the DSM-IV 47 
(1994), and the DSM-IV-TR (2000), only reinforced 48 
the world domination of  the DSM. The DSM 49 
quickly supplanted most national classifications, 50 
wiped them from memory, and contributed to an 51 
unprecedented homogenization and universalization 52 
in the practice of  psychiatry. It even influenced the 53 
WHO’s ICD [International Classification of  Dis-54 
eases], which, from 1992 on, came to adopt a struc-55 
ture and methodological principles that are very simi-56 
lar to the DSM’s .… Without a doubt, today no psy-57 
chiatrist in the world is unaware of  the meaning of  58 
the acronym “DSM,” even when many clinicians 59 
continue to resist the imperative to use this manual. 60 
Most certainly, all scientifically ambitious researchers 61 
in psychiatry must refer to the DSM, however unsat-62 
isfied they might be with the manual. Today, with the 63 
publication of  the DSM-5 in 2013, and despite all 64 
the criticisms and complaints directed against this 65 
new edition even before it was published (and often 66 
formulated by American psychiatrists themselves), 67 
the hegemony of  the American system remains in-68 
tact.” 69 
 70 
How can this success be explained? It seems also para-71 
doxically because, as Poland’s (2015) analysis demon-72 
strates, overall DSM-based research has not yielded any 73 
solid result and DSM provides researchers with de-74 
contextualized diagnoses that are symptom-based, atheo-75 
retical, polytheist, and not associated with well-confirmed 76 
tests and models. Rather, DSM has a flawed epistemologi-77 
cal structure and categories provide “artificial groupings” 78 
of  individuals experiencing mental illness. 79 
What is stated here is that the success of  DSM-III is 80 
not based on solid research and that the classes in this sys-81 
tem are not associated with research-based diagnostic tests 82 
or procedures. Therefore, its success seems paradoxical. 83 
Demazeux and Singy (2015) also write, however, that 84 
much criticism was raised against the new DSM-5. Thus, 85 
its success was perhaps temporary, and psychiatric diagno-86 
sis—and thus psychiatry as a whole—seems to be in a se-87 
rious crisis, very different from the general pattern of  88 
progress in other subfields of  medicine (see, e.g., Frances 89 
2013; Greenberg 2013; Maj 2015; Paris and Phillips 2013; 90 
and Zachar et al. 2014). Nonetheless, the atheoretical 91 
principle of  DSM-III was considered extremely successful, 92 
even a revolution (at least for a period), which is a fact that 93 
calls for an explanation. 94 
If  atheoretical action is an oxymoron, as argued above, 95 
it follows that DSM-III cannot be atheoretical, that there 96 
must be hidden theoretical assumptions in this system in 97 
spite of  its claim of  the opposite. The two following 98 
quotes provides an analysis of  this issue (Whooley and 99 
Horwitz 2013, 79): 100 
 101 
The revisions to the DSM-III sought to increase re-102 
liability through moving psychiatry away from the 103 
fluid psychoanalytic understanding of  mental illness 104 
toward a standardized nosology of  fixed disease 105 
categories. They overthrew the broad, continuous, 106 
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and vague concepts of  dynamic psychiatry and re-1 
placed them with a discrete system of  classification 2 
that treated mental disorders as discrete diseases. 3 
This nosology rigorously segregated the pathologi-4 
cal from the normal, in a way that the previous 5 
psychodynamic model never did. 6 
 7 
While the DSM-III revisions were advertised as ag-8 
nostic toward different theoretical schools of  psy-9 
chiatry [APA 1980], the entire endeavor—10 
delineating discrete disease categories to facilitate di-11 
agnostic consistency—implied an endorsement of  12 
the biomedical model. The revisions were sold as 13 
ways to improve treatment through empirically 14 
based research programs and targeted diagnoses. 15 
The new paradigm of  diagnostic psychiatry organ-16 
ized symptoms into discrete disease entities with the 17 
expectation that the organic bases of  these entities 18 
would soon be discovered [Horwitz 2002]. In other 19 
words, the revisions to the DSM were a strategy to 20 
attain a biomedical model by understanding illnesses 21 
as stable entities that can be explained in terms of  22 
specific causal mechanisms located in the brain. The 23 
hope was that the identification of  the elusive bio-24 
logical or genetic markers for mental disorders 25 
would follow from the standardized classification 26 
system. DSM-III promised a future when specific 27 
etiologies were discovered for specific disorders and, 28 
in turn, specific treatments would emerge. 29 
 30 
Whooley and Horwitz (2013) thus argue that DSM-III was 31 
indeed based on a (meta)theoretical view, the view of  bio-32 
logical psychiatry as opposed to, among others, psycho-33 
dynamic and cultural views. A narrow biological view of  34 
mental illness is opposed to a rather broadly recognized 35 
view that mental illness should be understood from a 36 
combined biological, psychological and social perspective. 37 
For those, who believe that a form of  biopsychosocial 38 
model provides the best scientific explanation of  mental 39 
illness, the adaption of  the strict biological view underly-40 
ing DSM-III does not provide scientific advance, but on 41 
the contrary: it represents a reductionist scientific ideol-42 
ogy. This ideology was extremely successful by strength-43 
ening the professional powers of  psychiatrists at the ex-44 
pense of  other professions involved in mental health, in 45 
standardizing psychiatry and gaining support from power-46 
ful institutions such as health assurance and the pharma-47 
cological industry. This is the basic explanation of  the 48 
success of  DSM-III as described by Whooley and Horwitz 49 
(2013). However, because this ideology is not scientifically 50 
based—but based on anticipation, the expectation that the 51 
organic bases of  these entities would soon be discov-52 
ered—the system fails because the expected findings did 53 
not turn up and thus it has severe problems reflecting a 54 
natural classification of  mental illness. Therefore, the sys-55 
tem is today in a serious validity crisis as revealed by a 56 
growing critical literature. The issue about the biological 57 
basis of  mental diseases has not been settled but remains 58 
highly controversial. The point here is that different theo-59 
ries should be developed, brought into a dialogue and ne-60 
gotiated. The disregarding of  other theories without 61 
proper basis in research is ideological rather than scien-62 
tific. The atheroretical attitude contributes to such an ide-63 
ology. Also Foerstl and Hoff  (2009, 57) argued against 64 
atheoretical classification of  psychiatric disorders and 65 
wrote: 66 
 67 
Wir sollten auf  dem Boden einer aufgewerteten Psy-68 
chopathologie die unfruchtbare Polarisierung „theo-69 
riereich“ vs. „theoriearm“/„theoriefrei“ hinter uns 70 
lassen .... Was wir brauchen in der Psychiatrie, ist kei-71 
ne „Theoriephobie, “ sondern reflektierte und damit 72 
undogmatische Theorie. 73 
 74 
Thus, our analysis so far has shown that the success of  the 75 
“atheoretical” DSM-III was based on: 76 
 77 
1)  That it was not atheoretical as it claimed to be. Rather, it 78 
was supporting a reductionist biomedical theory of  79 
mental illness (although only in a very general way). 80 
This is the hidden theoretical assumption that Whooley 81 
and Horwitz (2013) uncovered.  82 
2)  Its contribution to the homogenization and universali-83 
zation of  the practice of  psychiatry and to the power of  84 
the psychiatric profession. This was obtained by the 85 
emphasis on reliability at the expense of  validity as we 86 
shall consider in a following section.  87 
 88 
4.0 Artificial versus natural classification 89 
 90 
Poland (2015) characterized DSM’s categories as “artificial 91 
groupings.” The distinction between artificial and natural 92 
classification is important. An artificial classification may 93 
be useful for limited purposes. For example, we often or-94 
ganize documents and document representation in artificial 95 
ways (e.g. in alphabetical order), which for many purposes 96 
have proven to be very practical. However, in order to re-97 
trieve things of  a specific natural kind, those things have to 98 
be identified, named and classified, which presupposes a 99 
subject approach and natural classification. 100 
William Perry and Edward Hacker wrote (1991, 133):  101 
 102 
For example, one may divide rocks—or even ani-103 
mals—into those weighing less than ten grams, 104 
those weighing at least ten but less than twenty 105 
grams, and so on; but this is likely to be of  little 106 
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use, except perhaps for knowing what it would cost 1 
to mail them. 2 
 3 
And later:  4 
 5 
[A classification] is fruitful to the extent that it sug-6 
gests new hypothesis, explanations, and theories 7 
concerning its subject matter. For example, the pe-8 
riodic table—the classification of  the elements—9 
proved extremely fruitful, since it suggested the ex-10 
istence of  hitherto unknown elements and even 11 
suggested what physical properties they would 12 
have. It should be noted that natural classifications, 13 
by definition, are more fruitful than artificial ones. 14 
 15 
To make an extreme case, one could classify all mental 16 
patients according to their weight, which would be “an 17 
artificial grouping” that would not be helpful for treat-18 
ment decisions (but it would be highly objective and reli-19 
able!). “A natural classification” of  mental patients, on the 20 
other hand, would be one that could be helpful predicting 21 
which patients would benefit from a particular treatment. 22 
Such a natural classification should be based on theory 23 
and knowledge of  mental diseases. This example is ex-24 
treme, of  course, but theoretical clarity is often obtained 25 
by considering such “pure” examples. This clarity can 26 
thereafter also be applied to less extreme examples. 27 
 28 
5.0 Reliability versus validity of  classifications 29 
 30 
The issue concerning artificial versus natural classification 31 
is related to the problem of  “reliability” versus “validity” 32 
of  classifications. “Reliability” means that different persons 33 
report the same result, (i.e., obtain consistency), corre-34 
sponding to the concept known as “inter-indexer consis-35 
tency” in knowledge organization (see Lancaster 2003, 68-36 
82). “Validity,” on the other hand, means that a description, 37 
a measurement or a representation is adequate in relation 38 
to its purpose. Often there is a high prestige for profes-39 
sionals connected to reliability (the same is also, of  course, 40 
expected for validity, but professionals in disagreement are 41 
easily revealed, and low reliability is in itself  a sign of  low 42 
validity, therefore there is a tendency to make priority to re-43 
liability). Probably the most important issue in the success 44 
of  DSM-III was that it made psychiatric diagnosis much 45 
more reliable—thereby increasing the status of  psychia-46 
trists (this has been the overall opinion, but Kirk and 47 
Kutchins (1992) nonetheless found DSM-III to be highly 48 
unreliable). High reliability was the top priority for the de-49 
signers of  that system and this importance is reinforced by 50 
the demand from, in particular, (American) insurance 51 
companies to make medical diagnoses reliable. Philips 52 
(2014, 164) states: 53 
The quest for this Holy Grail began back in 1980 54 
with DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association 55 
1980). The immediate goal of  that manual was to 56 
achieve the first step in a scientific nosology—57 
diagnostic reliability—with the use of  operational 58 
definitions and diagnostic criteria. With DSM-III we 59 
could be confident that clinicians and researchers in 60 
different countries would be talking about the same 61 
phenomenon when they discussed, for instance, 62 
schizophrenia. Built into the DSM-III process, how-63 
ever, was the understanding that reliable diagnoses 64 
could not yet claim to be valid; we could not feel 65 
comfortable that the diagnostic concept in question 66 
represented a distinct, real entity in the world. How 67 
did we know, for instance, whether the diagnostic en-68 
tity called schizophrenia described one distinct illness 69 
or several? In that way, the accomplishment of  70 
DSM-III immediately unleashed a new anxiety and a 71 
new goal—securing diagnostic validity. 72 
In prioritizing reliability over validity, the architects 73 
of  DSM-III assumed that ongoing research would 74 
lead to valid diagnostic constructs.  75 
 76 
However, let us return to the previous thought experiment: 77 
if  psychiatrists classify their patients according to, for ex-78 
ample, their weight, they would be able to provide ex-79 
tremely reliable groupings, but would not create categories 80 
that would be helpful in determining treatments and pre-81 
dicting recovery. DSM-III of  course, used more valid crite-82 
ria than the patients’ weight, but the question of  lack of  83 
validity of  psychiatric diagnosis is today very pressing and 84 
the word “crisis” is probably not too strong a term to 85 
characterize the situation. A given mental disorder may be 86 
defined by a combination of  symptoms. “Schizophrenia,” 87 
for example, is mostly characterized (Zielasek and Gaebel 88 
2015, 9) by a combination of  symptoms including delu-89 
sions, hallucinations and disorganized thinking with disease 90 
onset in early adulthood. Any such set of  symptoms may 91 
be labeled schizophrenia as an artificial definition and clas-92 
sification. However, the claim that these symptoms corre-93 
spond to one and only one natural kind is a scientific hy-94 
pothesis that has to be proven. Some scientific classifica-95 
tions (e.g., bird classifications) have today a solid scientific 96 
basis (about the recent progress in classification of  birds, 97 
see Fjeldså 2013). No corresponding solid scientific basis 98 
supports our present classification of  psychiatric diagnoses 99 
and the important point is that the categories in a system 100 
like DSM have to be considered scientific hypotheses. 101 
Their revision should therefore be based on considering 102 
the supporting evidence as well as the evidence supporting 103 
alternative categories. Again, we may conclude that it is 104 
paradoxical not to consider these categories as theories. 105 
What kind of  decision has produced these categories? Of  106 
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course many years of  psychiatric research, practice and ex-1 
perience has gone into this. But how are the specific deci-2 
sions in a given edition of  the DSM made? The DSM-III 3 
Task Force wrote (APA 1980, 3): 4 
 5 
In attempting to resolve various diagnostic issues, 6 
the Task Force relied, as much as possible, on re-7 
search evidence relevant to various kinds of  diag-8 
nostic validity. For example, when discussing a 9 
problematic diagnostic category, the Task Force 10 
considered how the disorder, if  defined as pro-11 
posed, provided information relevant to treatment 12 
planning, course, and familial pattern. It should 13 
come as no surprise to the reader that even when 14 
data were available from relevant research studies, 15 
Task Force members often differed in their inter-16 
pretations of  the findings.  17 
 18 
This general method has comically been summarized as 19 
the BOGSAT method: “A bunch of  guys sitting around a 20 
table” (Kendler and Parnas 2012, 141). It should be con-21 
sidered that in evidence based medicine (EBM), evidence 22 
from expert committee reports or opinions and/or clini-23 
cal experience of  respected authorities is considered a 24 
very low criterion of  evidence, (cf. Hjørland 2011, 1302). 25 
There is much criticism about the DSM system and its 26 
emphasis on reliability and a quote from the book Philoso-27 
phical Issues in Psychiatry (Parnas and Sass 2008, 271) reads: 28 
“Excessive and, in our view, epistemologically naïve focus 29 
on the issues of  reliability created serious problems con-30 
cerning the more fundamental level of  validity.”  31 
Such an excessive focus on reliability at the expense of  32 
validity is connected to positivist currents and naïve real-33 
ism. While consistency has normally been regarded as an 34 
ideal also in knowledge organization, Cooper (1969) pro-35 
vided some important reservations in relation to this 36 
ideal. He demonstrates that indexers that are most consis-37 
tent with each other do not necessarily produce the best 38 
work and that indexing “can be consistently bad.” While 39 
this might seem strange, it is understandable if, for exam-40 
ple, indexers have been taught bad principles. Superficial 41 
indexing may, for example, rely too much on titles of  the 42 
documents being indexed, which tends to produce con-43 
sistent but bad indexing. The same is of  course the case 44 
about “indexing” psychiatric patients into diagnostic 45 
classes. The principle “reliability before validity” is thus a 46 
problematic principle connected to the ideal of  atheoreti-47 
cal classification. 48 
 49 
6.0 “Descriptive” versus “theoretical” classifications 50 
 51 
DSM-III and later editions (see Tsou 2015a) are said to be 52 
“descriptive” rather than theoretically committed. How-53 
ever, as Gregory Bateson wrote (1977, 147), it is problem-54 
atic to consider “descriptions” an atheoretical activity: 55 
 56 
You can never get away from theories of  the nature 57 
of  description whenever, wherever you have descrip-58 
tions. All descriptions are based on theories of  how 59 
to make descriptions. You cannot claim to have no 60 
epistemology. Those who so claim have nothing but 61 
a bad epistemology. And every description is based 62 
upon, and contains implicitly, a theory of  how to de-63 
scribe. 64 
 65 
(Unfortunately, this brief  but important statement is not 66 
much unfolded in the source from which it is here quoted). 67 
 68 
Indeed, since Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of  Scientific Revolu-69 
tions, the notion of  the theory-laden nature of  observa-70 
tions (and by implication the theory-laden nature of  de-71 
scriptions) has become a fundamental assumption in the 72 
philosophy of  science. By implication, the distinction be-73 
tween “descriptive” and “theoretical” classifications is 74 
problematic—as already indicated with Sellars’ (1956) no-75 
tion “the myth of  the given” mentioned above. (This 76 
recognition of  the theoretical ladenness of  descriptions 77 
may have further important implications for the use of  78 
this term in knowledge organization, e.g., in the concepts 79 
“descriptive bibliography” and “descriptive cataloging”). 80 
In order to understand the atheoretical approach in 81 
DSM-III, we shall look at what is here meant by “descrip-82 
tive” versus “theory-based” classification. It is well 83 
known that psychology and psychiatry have been split in 84 
many conflicting views or schools, e.g., psychoanalysis, 85 
cultural psychology, behaviorism, cognitivism, neurosci-86 
ence. Such views tend to develop their own conceptual 87 
systems and classifications. “Neurosis,” for example, is a 88 
psychoanalytic concept, “organic brain syndrome” is a 89 
concept associated with neuroscience. Although different 90 
theories may have their own domains for which they pro-91 
vide good explanations, they also tend to provide op-92 
posed views on the same phenomena. Different thera-93 
pists tend to subscribe more or less to one or another of  94 
those views (although eclecticism, the subscribing to dif-95 
ferent, perhaps conflicting views, is a widely held posi-96 
tion, it is not a position that can avoid the problems of  97 
theoretical commitment, cf. Slife and Williams 1995, 46-98 
48). The atheoretical nature of  DSM is first of  all an at-99 
tempt to make one classification that can serve all thera-100 
pists whatever view they have about the causes of  mental 101 
diseases. When etiology is unknown or controversial, 102 
DSM-III found (APA 1980, 7) that the definition of  a 103 
disorder must be at the “lowest order of  inference neces-104 
sary to describe the characteristic features of  the disor-105 
der.” Wakefield (1999, 966) suggested that rather than 106 
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speaking about an atheoretical strategy, DSM would have 1 
been more rigorous if  it had used the term “theory neu-2 
tral” categories or classification criteria with respect to 3 
plausible theories of  etiology. 4 
The atheoretical approach in DSM-III aimed at fulfill-5 
ing three different goals: 6 
 7 
1.  It aimed at moving beyond ideological divisions and 8 
towards science; 9 
2.  It aimed at temporarily setting aside the etiological is-10 
sue in order to focus on acute descriptions of  mental 11 
disorders; and, 12 
3.  It aimed at reforming the usual clinical vocabulary by 13 
avoiding as much as possible any claims about mental 14 
events. 15 
 16 
However, one might ask: is it possible to avoid theory 17 
(“ideology”) in science and scholarship? Melvin Sabshin, 18 
the medical director of  the APA during this period, con-19 
sidered that the success of  the DSM-III was a victory of  20 
science over ideology (Sabshin 2008). Steeves Demazeux, 21 
however, commented (2015, 7, note 3): 22 
 23 
It is nevertheless interesting to note that the opposi-24 
tion between science and ideology has different 25 
meanings in Sabshin’s work: in 1964, Sabshin and his 26 
colleagues defined “ideology” as including any 27 
“theoretical models of  mental disorders” (see Strauss 28 
et al. 1964, 8). This conciliatory definition tends to 29 
consider that science and ideology are always inextri-30 
cably intertwined. But in his 2006 book, Sabshin de-31 
fines “ideology” as all “scientifically unsupported 32 
dogmas” (Sabshin 2006, 36). Here, ideology is clearly 33 
set outside the range of  science (see Demazeux 34 
2013, 152). With distance and hindsight, it is clear 35 
that, according to Sabshin, the atheoretical perspec-36 
tive of  the DSM-III is scientific in opposition to 37 
ideological in the second sense.  38 
 39 
Sabshin (2008) is thus wrong in both senses: first, that the-40 
ory (which he associated with ideology) is not opposed to 41 
science. On the contrary, science is based on theoretical 42 
developments; and second, because DSM-III itself  is not 43 
sufficiently scientifically supported, this argument cannot 44 
be used against other theories. It is rather Sabshin himself  45 
(and the atheoretical principle of  DSM-III) that introduces 46 
a kind of  ideological bias, which impedes scientific pro-47 
gress by subscribing to the principle “reliability before va-48 
lidity” (Callender 2013, 77, emphasis added): 49 
 50 
There are also downsides to what is described in this 51 
book as the “reliability first, validity second” ap-52 
proach. One of  these is that diagnostic entities be-53 
come “self-perpetuating feedback loops.” Although 54 
they may only be rough approximations to “real” 55 
conditions (if  such things can be said to exist), they 56 
become the phenotypes that are used in research. A 57 
genetic study of  schizophrenia will be a study of  58 
DSM-defined schizophrenia. An antidepressant drug 59 
trial will be carried out on patients with DSM-60 
defined depression. DSM categories determine what 61 
questions can be asked and therefore risk becoming 62 
a system that impedes rather than advances scientific progress.  63 
 64 
Descriptions are not atheoretical, although the persons 65 
doing the descriptions may be unaware of  their theoreti-66 
cal influences and thereby produce “biased” descriptions. 67 
As argued in Hjørland (2016), explicit and considered 68 
subjectivism should be preferred for subjectivity dis-69 
guised as objectivity. Further problems in the descriptive 70 
approach to classification are presented in the section be-71 
low about epistemological hubs. 72 
 73 
7.0  Ontological versus epistemological approaches 74 
to classification 75 
 76 
In the community of  knowledge organization research-77 
ers, there seem to be two different approaches, the onto-78 
logical approach and the epistemological approach, and 79 
some researchers try to combine these two approaches 80 
(Kleineberg 2015, 194): “As pointed out by Gnoli (2008), 81 
the open question remains in which way ontology-82 
oriented and epistemology-oriented approaches might be 83 
integrated in order to benefit from their possibly com-84 
plementary character.” 85 
However, as argued by Sadegh-Zadeh (2015, 759), 86 
“ontology cannot be independent of  epistemology. The 87 
quality of  an epistemology will influence, via the knowl-88 
edge it approves or refutes, the quality of  the corre-89 
sponding ontology. For instance, compare the world of  90 
an astrologer with that of  an astronomer.” In knowledge 91 
organization, a well-informed paper about this question, 92 
Martínez-Ávila & Fox (2015, 16) wrote: 93 
 94 
The existence of  different categorial schemes and 95 
the disagreements about the “nature” of  those cate-96 
gories highlights the importance of  epistemology as 97 
a complement to ontology rather than as a separate 98 
entity. Though one might claim a singular ontological 99 
arrangement of  concepts, the philosophical objec-100 
tions to this ontological arrangement must be under-101 
stood in order to justify one’s claims. 102 
 103 
I believe the present paper is a further argument for the 104 
necessity of  considering epistemological issues in classifi-105 
cation, and I challenge everybody to put forward a classi-106 
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fication of  mental diseases—or just defend an existing 1 
one—based on “the ontological approach,” ignoring 2 
epistemological issues. When we consider such a specific 3 
example, the necessity for an epistemological approach 4 
seems evident. What has been termed “the ontological 5 
approach” in knowledge organization is in reality an 6 
atheoretical approach. If  not, on what basis are the crite-7 
ria of  semantic relations in the classification decided? 8 
How is it decided that A is a kind of  B? 9 
 10 
8.0 Classifications as epistemological hubs? 11 
 12 
Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer introduced in 13 
1989 the concept of  “boundary objects” which since has 14 
become very influential. They explicitly included classifi-15 
cations and defined it in this way (1989, 393): “Boundary 16 
objects are objects that are both plastic enough to adapt 17 
to local needs and the constraints of  the several parties 18 
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a com-19 
mon identity across sites.”  20 
Is a classification like DSM a boundary object? Or, 21 
how should it be constructed if  we wanted it to serve as a 22 
boundary object? Jonathan Tsou suggested (2015a, 43) 23 
that DSM should be designed to serve as an “epistemo-24 
logical hub”: 25 
 26 
I argue that the DSM should reconceive of  its goals 27 
more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an 28 
epistemic hub that mediates among various con-29 
texts of  use in which definitions of  mental disor-30 
ders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance 31 
of  pluralism as a methodological means for avoid-32 
ing theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the 33 
DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual.  34 
 35 
As far as I understand an “epistemological hub” is equiva-36 
lent to a “boundary object” (and it seems to me to be a 37 
better term). Tsou’s suggestion on how to design DSM for 38 
better serving this goal seems to be more clear than the 39 
one provided by Star and Griesemer (and it also seems to 40 
be better related to our discussions of  “descriptive” versus 41 
“theoretical” classifications). Tsou (2015a) examined the 42 
goals of  DSM-III, which were guiding treatment, facilitat-43 
ing research, and improving communication. He suggested 44 
that the DSM’s purely descriptive approach is best suited 45 
for improving communication among mental health pro-46 
fessionals, but theoretical approaches would be superior 47 
for purposes of  treatment and research. He also outlined 48 
steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system 49 
of  classification that can accommodate the benefits of  de-50 
scriptive and theoretical approaches, and discussed how the 51 
DSM’s descriptive categories could be revised to incorpo-52 
rate theoretical information regarding the causes of  disor-53 
ders. He argues that the DSM should reconceive of  its 54 
goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an 55 
epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts. 56 
At first reading, this suggestion seemed highly persua-57 
sive to me. However, my second thought was: what is the 58 
purpose of  communicating “descriptive” classifications if  59 
they are not valid? Because the etiology of  mental diseases 60 
is often unknown, their definitions sometimes must—as 61 
also stated by Tsou (2015a, 45) —be based on descriptions 62 
of  symptoms and on emphasizing that “the importance of  63 
pluralism as a means to ensure that the DSM is informed 64 
by a multiplicity of, sometimes conflicting, scientific theo-65 
ries on psychopathology.” We cannot here go deeper into 66 
this problem, but the solution for DSM—or another sys-67 
tem trying to serve as “boundary objects” or “epistemo-68 
logical hubs” for defining and classifying objects—should 69 
probably be to outline the most important alternative theo-70 
ries, their conceptions and classifications. Then a conver-71 
sion table or “crosswalk” should be established (although 72 
this may turn out to be difficult due to the taxonomic in-73 
commensurability of  different theories, cf. Oberheim and 74 
Hoyningen-Huene 2013). Andersen, Barker and Chen 75 
(2006, 42-64) presented a system for representing concepts 76 
by means of  dynamic frames, which may also be worth 77 
further examination in the KO-community in relation to 78 
epistemological hubs. The concept “bird,” for example, 79 
may be defined by among other attributes the values of  the 80 
attributes “beak,” “neck,” “color,” “size,” foot” and “gait.” 81 
This system is also used to relate concepts in different sci-82 
entific theories or paradigms. 83 
 84 
9.0 Conclusion 85 
 86 
This article has put forward arguments that “atheoretical 87 
classification” is either an artificial classification or an oxy-88 
moron and in both cases unsatisfactory as a basis for scien-89 
tific taxonomies. We have considered one important exam-90 
ple of  an atheoretical classification, the DSM-III. This sys-91 
tem claims to be based on an atheoretical approach to clas-92 
sification, but it has been argued that its great success 93 
probably was not due to its lack of  theoretical commit-94 
ment but rather to two highly attractive ideological under-95 
pinnings: biological reductionism and “reliability before va-96 
lidity.” These two ideological underpinnings may both have 97 
impeded scientific progress in the field as well as the 98 
treatment of  psychiatric patients on a scientific basis. The 99 
apparent success of  DSM-III may therefore have been 100 
achieved at great cost. 101 
Only one example has been analyzed in this paper, but 102 
the analysis is related to my analysis of  the subjectivity of  103 
bibliometric maps (see Hjørland 2016). The principle 104 
about the theoretical foundation of  all knowledge organi-105 
zation systems (KOSs) should be a considered a general 106 
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principle in knowledge organization. It seems obvious, that 1 
for all KOSs the most important evaluation criterion is 2 
their theoretical commitments (which are often their hid-3 
den theoretical assumptions). This should therefore also be 4 
emphasized in the principles of  how to construe KOSs. 5 
This may not be easy, but something that cannot be ne-6 
glected without loss of  scientific credibility for knowledge 7 
organization. As claimed by Hjørland (2013), it is difficult 8 
to find other approaches to the field of  equal importance: 9 
knowledge organization has to be based on theories of  10 
knowledge. 11 
The idea of  atheoretical classification is, as mentioned 12 
above, associated with “positivism.” However, Turner 13 
(1993) realized that the founder of  positivism, Auguste 14 
Comte, had been misinterpreted and wrote “Comte would 15 
turn over in his grave” if  he was confronted with the pre-16 
sent-day understanding of  positivism. He demonstrated 17 
that Comte’s “positive science” clearly and explicitly in-18 
cluded a central role for theory and that Comte dismissed 19 
as unscientific the kind of  empirical research that is con-20 
ducted in the absence of  theory. My use of  the term 21 
“positivism” is derived from Kuhn’s (1962) criticism of  22 
logical positivism (although Kuhn was badly informed in 23 
the writings of  the logical positivists, see Tsou 2015b). 24 
The opposition between Kuhn and the positivist can per-25 
haps best be explained in this way: the positivists try to 26 
compare our theories with “reality” but according to 27 
Kuhn, this is not possible because we have no unmediated 28 
access to “reality.” We cannot compare our theories or be-29 
liefs about the world with “reality,” but only with alterna-30 
tive theories (see also Devlin 2015, 157). In Hjørland 31 
(2016) I also present my understanding of  “positivism” 32 
and the Kuhnian alternative. The basic argument is that 33 
researchers who do not reveal their theoretical basis and 34 
claim to be “objective” do in reality act on the basis of  a 35 
subjectivity disguised as objectivity. Therefore, we may 36 
conclude with Karl Theodor Jaspers (1913, here quoted 37 
from Maj 2015, 68 ): “if  anyone thinks he can exclude 38 
philosophy and leave it aside as useless, he will eventually 39 
be defeated by it in some obscure form or another.” 40 
The atheoretical view of  classification seems also to be 41 
related to standardization as an approach for constructing 42 
KOSs (see Fujigaki 2006). Standardization shall not be 43 
discussed further in the present paper, but it has recently 44 
struck me that standardization seems to be a rather wide-45 
spread approach in knowledge organization in need for a 46 
deeper examination of  its theoretical assumptions. 47 
Olson and Fox (2010) recommend Gayatri Spivak’s 48 
feminist Marxist postcolonial approach as a theoretical 49 
framework for uncovering bias and cultural imperialism in 50 
knowledge organization. At first, it seems paradoxical that 51 
such a view should provide more objectivity in research, 52 
but Harding (2015) puts forward a convincing argument. 53 
There is a lack of  research in knowledge organization 54 
based on subject knowledge and on considering the influ-55 
ence of  different theories on concepts and classification. 56 
Hope Olson’s research is an exception from this general 57 
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